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J. H. ZUmBALEN E., B. CONANT
NOTES
TO WHAT EXTENT IS THE REMEDY BY INJUNCTION
AVAILABLE IN BEHALF OF PRIVATE AND
PUBLIC INTERESTS IN CONTROVERSIES
BETWEEN CAPITAL AND ORGANIZED
LABOR
The availability of the injunction in labor controversies is a sub-
ject beset with difficulties due to the maze of conflicting decisions.
The various jurisdictions are in direct conflict on practically all the
important subdivisions of the subject and within each jurisdiction
there are many discordant cases. Labor controversies are of such
vital economic and political importance that it is impossible to expect
a dispassionate solution upon legal principles alone. The prejudices,
as well as the economic and political views of the judges, cannot but
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be projected into the decision of such cases. Thus we see that Massa-
chusetts with its appointive judiciary takes a very restricted view of
the rights of labor organizations, and is liberal in the use of the in-
junction, whereas, a State like Montana, where organized labor is
strong and influential, is inclined to be very indulgent.
The Federal law in labor controversies had been fairly well worked
out at the time of the enactment of the Clayton Act.1 This law, how-
ever, has thrown the very important subject of the boycott, as well
as many minor points, into considerable doubt. Although the act has
not thus far been construed by the Supreme Court, there are dicta in
a recent case2 indicating that the members of the court are not in
accord upon the application of the law.
The decree below, denying the injunction, was made before the
enactment of the Clayton Act, and the majority of the court affirmed
the decree on general equitable principles; but Holmes, J., in the
course of the majority opinion said that, in addition to the grounds
upon which the decision was based, the Clayton Act established a
policy inconsistent with the granting of an injunction in the case,
whereas, the minority held that "the appellants are now entitled to an
injunction under Section 16 of the Clayton Act." Several decisions
of inferior Federal courts under the act exhibit a divergence of opin-
ion.3 In the face of this, any discussion of the changes effected by
the Clayton Act must be mere speculation until it has been construed
by the court of last resort, and such remarks as we may hereafter
make in reference thereto should be construed in that light.
Any discussion of the Lever Act4 and the cases decided there-
under would be outside the scope of this thesis, as it was purely tem-
porary legislation under the war powers; by Section 12, of the act,
it is provided that "The provisions of this act shall cease to be in
effect when the national emergency resulting from the existing state
of war shall have passed, the date of which shall be ascertained and
proclaimed by the President." It seems that "the national emergency
resulting from the existing state of war" has not yet passed and
is not likely to pass until some solution is found to the present treaty
1. 38 Stat. at Large, 730.
2. Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S., 459. "The solution of the
puzzle raised by a statute so blindly drawn as this one is not easy, and the
intimation as to the present division of the Supreme Court given (purely
obiter) in Paine, etc., Co. v. Neal, 244 U. S., 459, merely adds embarrass-
ment." Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 252 Fed., 722, 747.3. U. S. v. King, 250 Fed, 908.
Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering, Supra.
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Retail Clerks' I. P. Ass'n., 250 Fed., 522.
4. 40 Stat. at Large, 276.
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muddle at Washington. We are, until then, under war legislation and
an injunction may still be invoked under the Lever Act as in the
present coal strike.
Whatever may have been ancient common law upon the right
of workmen to organize for mutual benefit, there has never been any
doubt upon that point in this country. Labor organizations were held
subject to the provisions of the Sherman Act,5 and although no at-
tempt was ever made to dissolve them on that ground, labor leaders
declared such a power existed.6 Section 6 of the Clayton Act1 does
no more than declare them lawful organizations, which they always
were, and prevents their dissolution under the anti-trust acts as organ-
izations per se in restraint of trade. It is further provided in Section
6 that "nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed
. . . to forbid or restrain individual members of such organiza-
tions from lawfully carrying on the legitimate objects thereof." This
provision is only declaratory of the law then existing;8 as stated in
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal,9 neither in the language of the section, nor
in the committee reports, is there any indication of a purpose to render
lawful or legitimate anything that before the act was unlawful, whether
in the objects of such an organization or its members or in the
measures adopted to accomplish them."
In discussing the subdivisions of the subject no attempt will be
made to go into particular situations; in a thesis of this length such a
procedure is impossible, and only the underlying principles will be
considered, together with a consideration of the probable effect of
the Clayton Act upon Federal law.
By the weight of authority peaceful picketing is permissible....
The view taken by the majority of decisions, and which is best sup-
ported by reason, is that picketing, if not conducted in such numbers
as will in itself amount to intimidation and when confined to the
seeking of information such as the number and names and places of
residence of those at work or seeking work on the premises against
which the strike is in operation, and to the use of pea.eful argument
5. Loewe v. Lawlor 208 U. S., 274, same case 235 U. S., 522.
U. S. v. Workingmen's Council, 57 Fed., 85.
6. 63rd Long., 2nd Sess. Senate Report No. 698, p. 10.
7. "Nothing contained in the anti-trust laws shall be construed to
forbid the existence and operation of labor . . . organizations instituted
for the purpose of mutual help . . . nor shall such organizations or the
members theerof be held or constituted to be illegal combinations or con-
spiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust acts."
8. "The intention of Congress becomes manifest to make this Section
6 a mere declaratory statement of existing law."-Address of Ex-Pres. Taft,
Proceedings of A. B. A. 1914, p. 374.
9. Cited supra, at p. 484.
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and entreaty for the purpose of procuring such workmen to support
the strike by quitting the work, is not unlawful, and will furnish no
ground for injunction. . . That the views set forth in this sec-
tion are correct will admit of no doubt.* Another line of decisions
holds all picketing is per se unlawful, and no distinction is made be-
tween the modes or objects of the picketing.10
In those jurisdictions where picketing is permitted, any threats,
intimidation, or coercion will be enjoined, and such intimidation or
coercion need not consist of violence or words conveying an active
threat of bodily harm; it is enough if the picketing is done in such
numbers or in such a manner that a reasonably courageous man would
be deterred from offering his service to the employer.11 Even though
the picketing is peaceful, it may, nevertheless, be restrained if the
object is unlawful. Thus, peaceful picketing will be restrained if its
object is to persuade workmen to break their contracts to serve for a
definite period, 12 and picketing, irrespective of its methods, would
likewise be enjoined if it were done with express malice, or for the
purpose of injuring the person against whom it is directed and not to
benefit the labor organization. s
The Federal courts fully recognize peaceful picketing as lawful. 14
In Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., cited below, the
injunction in the trial court enjoined picketing simpliciter and the
Appellate Court modified the injunction to read "picketing in; a
threatening and intimidating manner." The Clayton Act, in so far as
9a. Martin's Modern Law of Labor Unions. Sec. 169.
The same conclusion is reached in a note in 4 L. R. A. (N. S.) 302.
Karges Furniture Co. v. Amalgamated Woodworkers, 165 Ind. 421.
Jones v. E. Van Winkle Gun & Mach. Works, 131 Ga., 336.
Butterick Pattern Co. v. Typographical Union, 10 N. Y. Supp., 292.
Everett Waddey Co. v. Typographical Union, 105 Va., 188.
Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash., 531.
10. Vegelahn v. Gunter, 167 Mass., 92.
Beck v. Ry. Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich., 497.
Barnes v. Chicago Typographical Union, 232 Ill., 424.
A recent Missouri case, Hughes v. Motion Picture Operators' Union,
not yet reported, seems to put Missouri in the minority on this question.
Press reports indicate that this case will overrule or qualify Berry Foundry
Co. v. International Moulders' Union, 177 Mo. App. 84, and Ex parte
Heffron, 179 Mo. App., 639, both of which approved in clear terms peaceful
picketing.
11. Cumberland Glass Mfg. Co. v. Glass Bottle Blowers' Ass'n., 59
N. J. Eq., 49.
Herzog v. Fitzgerald, 74 N. Y. App. Div., 110.
Everett Waddey Co. v. Typographical Union, 105 Va., 188.
See New Jersey Printing Co. v. Cassiday, 63 N. J. Eq., 759, for, a novel
theory of the employers' rights to the labor market.
12. Iron Moulders' Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed., 45.
13. Parkinson v. Trades Council, 154 Cal., 581, 603.
14. Iron Moulders'. Union v. Allis Chalmers Co., 166 Fed., 45.
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it respects picketing, is merely declaratory of existing Federal law.
It provides in Section 20 that "No such restraining order or injunc-
tion . . . shall prohibit any person or persons, whether singly or in
concert, . . . from recommending, persuading or advising others
by peaceful means" to terminate the relation of employment or cease
to perform any work or labor, "or from attending at any place where
any such person or persons may laurfully be, for the purpose of peace-
fully persuading any person to work or refrain from working . .
or from peacefuly assembling in a lawful manner for lawful pur-
poses." What are peaceful means, peaceful persuasion, and peaceful
assemblages in a lawful manner for lawful purposes is left undefined,
and they can only be what the Federal courts have already defined or
passed upon as peaceful and lawful. These provisions do not in any
way affect the present body of Federal law on picketing or assem-
bling during strikes.1 5
The law of the boycott is a confused tangle and we shall only con-
sider some of the controlling principles and the broad lines of con-
flict. The basis of injunctive relief in the boycott is conspiracy against
property or civil rights. The accepted definition of common law con-
spiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to do an unlaw-
ful act or a lawful act in, an unlaivful manner. From this we pass to
the much controverted question whether many can lawfully do in
concert what one can do singly. Strict logic would lead to the con-
clusion that the uniting of two or more persons in the doing of an
act which any one of them could do singly cannot change the essen-
tial character of the act or the manner of doing it so as to render
either of them unlawful,"6 although it may accomplish results which are
oppressive or socially disastrous. The weight of authority, however, is
against what seems to be the strict logic of the situation. "It is also
broadly stated in many decisions that what one may lawfully do singly,
any number of men acting in combination can do without rendering
themselves liable to civil action. . . . Nevertheless, this is against
the great weight of authority, which is to the effect that while the
act of an individual may not be unlawful, yet the same act when com-
mitted by a combination of individuals may be unlawful both in the
Trades Council v. American Steel Foundries, 238 Fed., 738.
Southern Ry. Co. v. Machinists' Local Union, III Fed., 54.
Aluminum Casting Co. v. Local No. 84, 197 Fed., 221.
15. Montgomery v. Pacific Ry. Co., 258 Fed., 389.
Stephens v. Telephone Co., 240 Fed., 759.
Alaska S. S. Co. v. International Longshoremen's Ass'n., 236 Fed.,
964.
16. Bohn Mfg. Co. v. -allis, 55 Minn., 223.
Lindsay v. Montana Fed. of Labor, 37 Mont., 26.
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sense of rendering the members of the combination liable to a crim-
inal prosecution, or to an action on the case for damages or to in-
junctive process."17
The so-called primary boycott is by the great weight of authority
and on principle clearly lawful. The primary boycott consists of an
agreement on the part of the members of the union or of any organ-
ization to cease business relations with a certain person or persons
against whom they have a grievance.' s Strictly speaking, the primary
boycott is not a boycott in the true sense of the term; as the Court
says, through Van Orsdel. J., in American Fed. of Labor v. Buck
Stove & Range Co.." "It will be observed that there is no boycott
until the members of the organization have passed the point of re-
fusing to patronize the person or corporation themselves, and have
entered the field where, by coercion or threats, they prevent others
from dealing with such persons or corporation. I fully agree with
the distinction. So long. then. as the American Federation of Labor,
and those actinz under its advice, refused to patronize complainants,
the combination had not risen to the dignity of an unlawful conspiracy
or boycott." This is in accord with the much quoted definition of a
boycott in Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.,20 "A boycott is
a combination of many to cause loss to one person by coercing others,
against their will, to withdraw from him their beneficial business inter-
course, through threats that, unless those others do so, the many will
cause a similar loss to them."
When the union passes beyond the point of peaceful persuasion
or agreeing inter se not to deal with its opponents and seeks to coerce
others not to deal with them through threats of strikes or boycotts of
such others, we have the secondary boycott. By the weight of au-
thority the secondary boycott is illegal and will be enjoined.2' There
are, however, a few States in which the secondary boycott is legal
17. Martin's Moderm Law of Labor Unions, Sec. 28.
Buck's Stove & Range Co. v. Am. Fed. of Labor, 35 App. D. C., 797.
Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass., 272.
A. R. Barnes & Co., v. Chicago Typo. Union, 232 Ill., 424, etc.
18. Martin's Modern Law of Labor Unions, Sec. 71.
Bohn Mfg. Co. v. Hallis, 54 Minn., 223.
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal., 70.
19. 33 App. D. C., 83, 117.
20. 54 Fed., 730, 738.
21. Gray v. Building Trades' Council, 91 Minn., 17.
Lohse Patent Door Co. v. Fuelle, 215 Mo., 421.
Beck v. Ry. Teamsters' Protective Union, 118 Mich., 497.
Jensen v. Cooks' & Waiters' Union, 39 Wash., 531, etc.
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and no injunction will issue on that ground alone.22 According to
one of these cases, they may not only concertedly withdraw all busi-
ness relations and induce others to do the same, but "they may even
go further than this, and request of another that he withdraw his
patronage from the employer, or may use the moral intimidation and
coercion of threatening a like boycott against him, if he refuse to do
SO. '28 Even in these jurisdictions, however, the boycott will be en-
joined if the purpose is not the promotion of the interest of the mem-
bers, but malicious, and for the express purpose of injuring the per-
son against whom it is directed.24
The Federal laws, up to the time of the enactment of the Clayton
Act, held the primary boycott legal, and the secondary boycott illegal
and enjoinable .2  The Clayton Act has cast serious doubts upon the
present body of Federal law relating to the boycott. The pertinent
portiton of the act is the following extract from Section 20: "No
restraining order or injunction shall be granted by any court of the
United States or a judge or the judges thereof, in any case between
an employer and employees, or between employers and employees
. . . involving or growing out of a dispute concerning terms and
conditions of employment unless necessary to prevent irreparable in-
jury to property, or a property right, of the person making the appli-
cation. . . . And no such restraining order or injunction shall pro-
hibit any person or persons , , , from ceasing to patronize or to
employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising,
or persuading others by peaceful and lawful means so to do." This
does not affect the prior stand of the court on the primary boycott,
but it seems, if such were necessary, to settle it beyond any doubt.
Whether it affects the present law of the secondary boycott, there is
much doubt.
The case which threatens to make profound and fundamental
changes in the Federal law on boycotting is Duplex Printing Press
Co. v. Deering,26 decided by a divided court in the Circuit Court of
Appeals. Complainant, a manufacturer of printing presses, ran an
22. National Protective Ass'n. v. Commings, 170 N. Y., 315.
Bossert v. Dhuy, 22f N. Y., 342.
Pierce v. Stablemen's Union, 156 Cal.. 70.
Lindsay v. Montana Fed. of Labor, 37 Mont., 264.
23. Pierce v. Stablemen's Union', supra.
24. See Bossert v. Dhuy, supra.
25. American Federation of Labor v. Buck Stove & Range Co., supra.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. S. D. Retail, etc., Dealers' Ass'n. 150
Fed., 413.
Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 83 Fed., 912.
26. 252 Fed., 722.-The advance sheets of the Federal Reporter indicate
that this case has not been taken up to the Supreme Court on certiorari.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
open shop in the State of Michigan, defendants are officers and mem-
bers of the International Association of Machinists. The defendants,
in order to force complainant to unionize its business, visited its cus-
tomers in New York and told them that complainant was unfair and
that union men would not handle or install complainant's presses,
and in several instances called strikes to prevent truckmen from haul-
ing them and mechanics from installing them for complainant's cus-
tomers. They also threatened that they would call a strike of such
customers' employees if they insisted on installing them. None of
the defendants had ever been employees of the complainant; com-
plainant asks an injunction against these acts. We have here a sec-
ondary boycott, and, more than that, a case indistinguishable from
Loewe v. Lawlor, 7 a fact which both majority and minority of the
court recognized and emphasized.25
The Court refused the injunction, holding that the Clayton Act
had legalized the secondary boycott.29 This is a revolutionary change
in the Federal law of boycott and conspiracy. In arriving at this con-
clusion, the construction of certain portions of Section 20 is of far.
reaching effect. The act provides that no injunction shall issue in
any controversy between employer and employee, or employers and
employees. In the instant case the relationship of employer and em-
ployee had never existed between complainant and respondents, and
the Court held that these terms referred to the hirer and the hired in
the generic sense of the term, and that the prohibition of the statute
was not limited to those cases in which the relation of the employer and
employee exists or formerly existed. In this the Court does not seem
to be in accord with certain observations of the Supreme Court in
Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal,30 and the opinions of several distinguished
commentators on the act.$' It may readily be seen that this is a matter
of profound importance; the construction adopted in the Duplex
case would prevent injunctions in those cases where the complainant
27. 208 U. S., 274; 235 U. S., 522.
28. Se pp. 742, 747.
29. See U. S. v. King, 250 Fed., 908.-Secondary boycott conducted by
an agricultural association not conducted for profit and so within Sec. 6 of
Clayton Act. Held: Secondary boycott illegal, organizations described in
Clayton Act not permitted to adopt methods of carrying on their affairs
forbidden to other lawful associations. Although not a labor case, opinion
includes them in its conclusions.
See also opinion expressed by Ex-Pres. Taft in address before A. B. A.
contra to decision in case. "It therefore follows that, in spite of Sec. 20,
parties to a labor dispute on one side may have an injunction against parties
on the other side to prevent the latter from using as a weapon in the fight
such a boycott of outsiders.'--Proceeding of A. B. A. 1914, p. 377.
30. 244 U. S., 459, 484.
31. Address of Ex-Pres. Taft, Proqeeding of A. B. A., 1914, pp. 37S-6.
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is no party to the controversy, whereas the other interpretation would
limit the prohibition against injunctions exclusively to the parties
to the dispute.
The result of this case seems to be that labor unions are exempted
from the operation of the anti-trust laws. Under the Sherman Act
the right to an injunction for a violation thereof was exclusively in
the United States, while Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides "that
any person, firm, corporation, or association shall be entitled to sue
for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the United States hav-
ing jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
under the anti-trust laws." As this case was conceded by the court to
be precisely the -same as Loewe v. Lawlor, in other words, a violation
of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, it called for an injunction under
the Clayton Act, if Loewe v. Lawlor is still law. It does not seem
possible in view of Section 16, that no injunction will issue, but that
nevertheless the labor organization is liable under the triple damage
clause.8 2 The effect of this can only be that the Clayton Act has
exempted labor unions from the operation of the anti-trust laws and
that no injunction is available on the ground that their action is in
restraint of trade and commerce among the several states. This result,
however, seems contrary to the intention of Congress. at least so far
as expressed in committee proceedings,8 8 and of commentatori on the
law.3 There are also dicta to the contrary in Paine Lumber Co. v.
Neal at page 485. "There is no grant, in terms or by necessary infer-
ence, of immunity in favor of boycott of traders in interstate corn-
merce, violative of the provisions of the Sherman Act, to which the
Clayton Act is supplemental." A question of this importance, which
would so seriously affect 'Federal law on such a vital economic and
social problem, will certainly be passed upon by the Supreme Court
in the near future and, until it is, all consideration of the question
32. Sec. 4 of the Clayton Act, a re-enactment of Sec. 7 of the Sherman
Ac.
See Dowd v. Unitel Mine Workers of America, 235 Fed., 423.
33. "It is not proposed by the bill or amendments, to alter, amend
or change in any respect the original Sherman Anti-Trust Act of July 2,
1890. The purpose is only to supplement that act and the other anti-trust
acts," and further, "The ibill does not interfere with the Sherman Anti-
Trust; it leaves the law of conspiracy untouched."
Report of the Judiciary Committee, 63rd Long., 2nd Sess., Senate Report
No. 698, p. 37.
34. Address of Ex-Pres. Taft cited supra at p. 378.---"It follows that
the new statute does not affect Loewe v. Lawlor at all."
"The net result of Sec 20 . . . is also to leave the prohibitions of
the Sherman Act untouched; the labor union which restrains interstate
trade by unlawful acts, or by the pursuit of an illegitimate end Is still liable
to the fate of the Danbury Hatters." 32 Harvard L. R., 635.
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is only speculation. However, there seems to be good grounds for
doubting the Duplex case.
It should be noted that the prohibition of Section 20 extends
only to cases involving or growing out of-a dispute concerning terms
and conditions of employment. The injunction is still available, as
before the enactment of the act, where the action of the labor organ-
ization arises from malice, or from an intent to injure the person
against whom it is directed and not to forward the interests of the
association. The Federal courts still have ample power under the
Clayton Act to enjoin acts of violence or other unlawful acts when-
ever "necessary to prevent irreparable injury to property, or a property
right," of the party making the application.3"
The principle that equity wil not compel the performance of a
contract for personal services nor enjoin anyone from quitting the
service of an employer needs no citation of authority. In Farmers'
Loan & Trust Co. v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. 6 the District Court
enjoined the employees "from so quitting the service of the said
receiver, with or without notice, as to cripple the property or prevent
or hinder the operation of said railroad." On appeals7 the quoted
portion was stricken out, since the employees had the right to quit
singly or unitedly at any time for any reason which might seem proper
to them, and whatever damage might result to the employer thereby
is damnum absque injuria. They cannot be enjoined from quitting
no matter what might be the result; such an injunction would amount
to enforcing involuntary servitude. "The fact that employees of the
railroad may quit under circumstances that show bad faith on their
part, or reckless disregard of their contract; or of the convenience
and interest of both employer and public, does not justify a departure
from the general rule that equity will not compel the actual, affirm-
ative performance of purely personal services or . . . require
employees, against their wills, to remain in the personal service of
their employer." The provisions of the Clayton Act are merely
declaratory of these well settled principles. It provides in Section 20
that "no such restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person
or persons, whether singly or in concert, from terminating any relation
of employment or from ceasing to perform any work or labor."
Although workmen themselves cannot be restrained from quitting,
35. Montgomery v. Pacific Ry. Co., 258 Fed., 389.
Kroger Grocery Co. v. Retail Clerks', etc., Ass'n., 250 Fed., 890.
Alaska S. S. Co. v. Int. Longshoremen's Ass'n., 236 Fed., 964.
36. 60 Fed., 803.
37. Arthur v. Oakes, 63 Fed., 310.
38. Arthur v. Oakes, supra.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol5/iss3/3
ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
officers of a union may be restrained from calling a strike for an
unlawful purpose. They will be enjoined where compliance with the
strike order would result in breaches of contracts of employment, 9
or where the object is to compel the employer to breach a contract with
a third party, 40 or to cause a violation of the Interstate Commerce
Act.41  Even though there is no contract of employment for any
definite period, equity will intervene to prevent unlawful interference
with the relationship. "The fact that the employment is at the will of
the parties respectively does not make it one at the will of others . .
and the unjustifiable interference of third persons is actionable
although the employment is at will."'42
In many cases dicta are to be found that employees of public
service corporations charged with duties in which the public is con-
cerned stand upon a different basis than others. In Toledo, etc., Ry.
Co. v. Pennsylvania Co.,4 the court says, "Holding to that employer
(the railroad), so engaged in this great public undertaking, the relation
they did, they owed to him and to the public a higher duty than though
their services had been due to a private person. . . . In ordinary
conditions as between employer and employee, the privilege of the latter
to quit the former's service at his option cannot be prevented by
restraint or force. . . . But those relative rights and powers nay
become quite different in the case of the employees of a great public
corporation, charged by the law with certain great trusts and duties
to the public." These expressions seem erroneous; they are expressly
negatived in Arthur v. Oakes. It is impossible to understand how
the employee's constitutional right to work or cease working is
affected by the nature of the employment. We may conclude, there-
fore, that the fact that the employment is one which vitally affects
the public is not in itself a ground for injunctive relief, nor is it an
additional circumstance which would cause an injunction to issue
where there is no other equitable ground for an injunction. Relief by
injunction in such cases stands upon the same equitable principles as
in others.
Under the Sherman Act the government was given the right to
an injunction to prevent violations of the act, and in one case this
was exercised against a strike which interfered with interstate com-
39. Hitchman Coal & Coke Co. v. Michell, 245 U. S., 229.
Barnes & Co. v. Berry, 156 Fed., 72.
Wabash Ry. Co. v. Harnahan, 121 Fed., 563.
40. Thomas v. Cincinatti, etc., Ry. Co., 62 Fed., 563.
41. Toledo, etc., Ry. Co. v. Pennsylvania Co., 54 Fed., 730
42. Truax v. Raich, 239 U .S., 33, 38.
See U. S. ex rel. Guaranty Trust Co. v. Haggerty et al., 116 Fed., 510.
43. 54 Fed., 746, 752.
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merce."' The Clayton Act extends this remedy to private persons
to prevent the injury or threatened injury from a violation of the
anti-trust laws, but it remains to be seen how far private persons will
be able to use this against labor organizations as it is doubtful to what
extent they are now subject to the anti-trust laws, The Clayton Act,
however, extended the prohibition of the injunction only to cases
between employers and employees, and it has not in any way affected
the right of the government in the interest of the public to an injunc-
tion under the anti-trust laws. But above any remedy given by
statutes, the government has an inherent right by virtue of its consti-
tutional power over commerce and transportation to enjoin any
obstruction thereto.4 5 In the Debs case the court makes it plain that
they do not rest their decision on the Sherman Act nor on the fact
that the government has a property right in the mails such as to
enable it to appear as a party plaintiff, but on a broader ground than
either of these, "Every government, entrusted, by the very terms
of its being, with powers and duties to be exercised and discharged
for the general welfare, has a right to apply to its own courts for any
proper assistance in the exercise of the one and the discharge of the
other, and it is no sufficient answer to its appeal to one of these courts
that it has no pecuniary interest in the matter. The obligation which
it is under to promote the interest of all, and to prevent the wrongV
doing of one resulting in injury, to the general welfare is often in itself
sufficient' to give it a standing in court."" and further, "In the exercise
of those powers (over commerce and the transportation of the mails)
it is competent for the government to remove all obstructions upon
highways, natural or artificial, to the passage of interstate commerce
or the carrying of the mail; that while it may be competent for the
government (through the executive branch and in the use of the entire
executive power of the nation) to forcibly remove all such obstruc-
tions, it is equally within its competence to appeal to the civil courts
for an inquiry and determination into the existence and character
of any alleged obstructions, and if such are found to exist, or threaten
to occur, to invoke the powers of those courts to remove or restrain
such obstructions. 4 T The Federal government would seem to have
the right to an injunction to restrain any unlawful interference with
its powers or functions by either party to a labor dispute outside of
any express statute.
44. U. S. v. Workingmen's Council, 54 Fed., 994, affirmed in 57 Fed., 85.
45. In re Debs, 158 U. S., 564.
46. In re Debs, p. 584.
47. At p. 599.
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A recent case, which seems to be of novel impression, is full of
possibilities for the protection of public rights by injunction on the
initiative of one of the public. 48 Complainants, subscribers of defend-
ant company, sued in a representative capacity in the interest of all
persons similarly situated, to compel the defendant to perform its
statutory duty of furnishing adequate service to all subscribers; the
defendant was unable to do so because of a strike in progress. The
court enforced this duty by decreeing that "all said persons and
parties are enjoined and restrained from doing any act or thing which
may interfere in any respect with the performance of the duties and
obligations of the defendant company as a common carrier." Under
this doctrine, any person interested in the performance of a statutory
duty by a public service corporation cati sue in the interest of all
persons similarly interested to enforce the performance of that duty
and to prevent anyone from unlawfully interfering with the perform-
ance thereof.
The Clayton Act is only the beginning of legislation to limit the
use of injunctions in labor controversies. Organized labor is carrying
on an active propaganda with this end in view. In two instances
certain features of these statutes have been declared unconstitutional.4"
To deny a property right or a constitutional right, the only remedy
which can effectively protect it, amounts to a denial of the right itself.
The Supreme Court has held that employer and employee have the
right of freely contracting for the purchase and sale of labor under
the 5th and 14th amendments, 50 and any legislation withdrawing the
employment of the injunction to protect and preserve these rights
would be unconstitutional. The courts will not permit the legislature
to encroach upon constitutional rights by denying them the full protec-
tion of the law, and we may depend upon the Federal and State
constitutions to prevent the abolition of the injunction where consti-
tutional rights are involved.
48. Stephens v. Ohio Telephone Co., 240 Fed., 759, in the District Court.
49. Bogni v. Perotti, 224 Mass., 152.
Goldberg Bowen & Co. v. Stablemen's Union, 149 Cal., 429, 434.
50. Adair v. U. S., 208 U. S., 161.
Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U. S., 1.
See Roraback v. Motion Picture Operators' Union, 140 Minn., 481, 486.
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